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Often, academic research is prompted by the personal interest of the researcher on a topic 
or an area of study. This is not the exception. A few years ago, I began studying policy 
assessment, a set of instruments used by some countries as a part of their policy-making 
process. This entails the identification of a policy problem and the assessment of potential 
regulatory or non-regulatory solutions to identify the benefits, costs, risks and other effects 
that the solutions would create. It also entails consultation with stakeholders; as well as the 
monitoring and assessment of regulations after their entry into force, to determine whether 
they are still producing the desired effects that motivated their enactment. I refer to this 
set of stages as the Policy Evaluation Cycle (PEC). The aim of the use of these instruments 
or stages is to inform the decision-making process of regulators in order for them to be able 
to enact regulations that are efficient, effective or serve specific goals. Lastly, policy 
assessment also concerns the governance of the aforementioned instruments and 
processes. All of these, the PEC and the governance of the instruments and processes, are 
referred to as the better regulation agenda. 
It is known that countries use laws and regulations as a means to achieve specific goals or 
as correctors to the undesired results of a self-operating market, to inequality, to 
unbalanced distribution of resources, and in general, to endogenous and exogenous factors 
that pull countries away from their objectives. In this sense, unassessed regulations can 
produce undesired adverse results, can clash with other existing regulations, can be 
incompatible with current market trends, or with preferences of the population or with 
technological improvements. They can even produce effects directly opposite to those 
needed to address the problem for which they were enacted.  
The use of scientific instruments to assess regulatory problems and regulatory proposals 
before their enactment, and afterwards through various points of regulations’ lives, 
however complex, seems to align with the overall normative goal of regulations and 
government intervention. From that stance, the adoption of a system or policies for 
assessing regulations is justified and, some may argue, desirable for most legal systems.  
Since these policies have been developed, adopted, and implemented by European 
countries, the United States, and other developed countries, I began researching on 
whether other regions were following the same steps. In that sense, in the last few years, a 
steadily increasing number of Latin American countries have been adopting instruments 
for policy assessment as part of their regulatory policy. I had a particular interest in 
researching this trend in this region, because it struck me as interesting why a group of 
countries, the majority of which are developing countries with similar constitutional 
structures, decided in a short period of time to adopt a complex, and resource-consuming, 
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set of instruments and policies for regulatory evaluation as part their regulatory-making 
process. 
Going back some decades, during the \]]^s and the early _^^^s, the Latin American 
scenario regarding regulatory production was characterized by an explosive growth of 
regulations and regulatory agencies. Arguably, this shift from the centralized provider-state 
to the regulator-state represented a considerable rise in the rate of delegation in the 
regulatory-making process. To some degree, this increase in the legislative work and also 
on regulatory agencies has also favored opportunities to improve regulatory efficiency, 
address identified market failures, and take the decision-making process closer to those 
affected.  
Therefore, this new trend that I observed in the Latin American region of adopting policy 
evaluation instruments seemed to respond initially to some of their regulatory needs. 
However, it could potentially also be explained by other rationales closer to the specific 
needs of the region. As with any important regulatory topic, whether to adopt or not policy 
evaluation instruments is not a binary question, or at least it should not be. It implies the 
consideration of several elements and changes to the decision-making process, to the legal 
culture, and to the regulatory governance of a country, which in turn means the use of 
already limited resources. Therefore, the desired and undesired effects that the adoption 
and implementation of a new process within the decision-making machinery of a country 
should also be considered. This requires more in-depth understanding, to be able to 
comprehend its inner workings, the elements that compose it, and the potential that they 
might have to address certain regulatory goals, as well as their shortcomings.   
Digging deeper into the rationales that countries may have to adopt these administrative 
arrangements into their decision-making processes, due to the necessary delegation that 
happens in the regulatory-making world, there is a rationale that comes forward: the need 
to have transparency and accountability measures in place. It could be argued that 
achieving these goals is desirable for Latin American countries as well, as in the last decade 
there has been a surge of demand for accountability, transparency and less corruption in 
the region. 
The literature argues that because of the inherent characteristics of policy evaluation and 
of the processes that need to be undertaken for assessing regulations, one of their features 
is that they contribute towards accountability (Ogus, _^^`; Radaelli, _^\^; Renda, _^\a). 
However, is it that straight-forward that adopting a better regulation agenda can contribute 
to accountability in the regulatory-making process of a Latin American country? In this 
Thesis, I argue that even though this could be true, there are many considerations to 
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incorporate when answering this question, particularly related to the legal system, the 
decision-making process, and regulatory relationships that exist in those countries. 
Therefore, I embarked on this research. 
3. Research Questions 
Considering the foregoing, in this Thesis the research concerns the policy assessment 
arrangements recently adopted and implemented in the Latin American region, and 
specifically the potential for accountability that these arrangements may have. This 
prompted a main research question:  
Why are Latin American countries adopting better regulation agendas? Can this contribute 
towards accountability, and if so, in which conditions? 
On the road to answering these over-arching research questions, several other research 
questions arise. For this, in each Chapter of this Thesis the aim is to answer a particular set 
of sub-questions that are divided as follows: 
Chapter < 
". What are the rationales behind the adoption of policy evaluation systems within the 
regulatory-making process of a country? 
Chapter =  
". Which are the composing elements of a regulatory evaluation structure? 
0. Which are the options that a country or administration can choose from to compose its 
regulatory evaluation structure? 
5. Which type of regulatory evaluation arrangement has the potential to create the conditions 
and incentives for the actors in a legal system in order to achieve specific regulatory goals? 
Chapter > 
". Which are the policy assessment goals and structures set by Latin American countries for 
their better regulation agenda? 
0. Do the elements chosen by Latin American countries for each component of the structure 
correspond to the goals previously set by selected countries? 
Chapter ? 
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". Which accountability relationships exist in the regulatory-making arrangement of Latin 
American countries? 
0. Which accountability problems can be identified in the regulatory relationships of a country 
with a presidential system?  
Chapter @  
". Could the Policy Evaluation Cycle contribute towards accountability, and if so, in which 
conditions? 
0. Considering the type of relationships that exist in this regulatory-making system, is it 
possible to address those problems with a better regulation agenda? 
 
A. Academic Relevance 
The study of all of the sub-components necessary to answer the main research question set 
for this Thesis, can be done from many areas of study. However, there are some that are 
evident, and not necessarily usually studied together. The first one is the literature on 
policy assessment; the second one is administrative law; and the third one is public law and 
economics. Granted, initially for the more skeptical reader the connection between these 
areas of study might not be evident; therefore, an explanation is needed. 
First, the link between policy assessment and law and economics has been previously 
explored by Renda (_^\\). He explained that ex ante assessment procedures would benefit 
from establishing arrangements that would consider how incentives affect the behavior of 
participants, and not merely the cost and benefits of the regulations. This left a whole set 
of questions to be answered in that field, some of which will be addressed in this research. 
The study of the instruments used for policy assessment, the scope of the assessment, its 
governance and the interaction between the combinations of all these elements, need to 
be researched using the literature on policy assessment in its intersection with public law. 
As indicated previously, the creation of regulations and the need for more efficient 
regulations are one of the main motivators for the existence of policy assessment 
procedures. Thus, how regulations are made, and more particularly, the legal and 
constitutional system in which this process is introduced, also plays a role in the eventual 
result of the assessment. In this sense, since the countries being considered for this study 
are Latin American countries, all of which have a presidential constitutional system, legal 
systems based on civil law, and a specific decision-making structure, the study of this needs 
to be done with the instruments that the public law and economics, and public 
administration literature provide. That is, the analysis of the actors that exist in that system 
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and that participate in the decision-making process; their appointment and removal; the 
interactions between these actors; the set of rules that this specific legal system sets to 
follow; and the incentives, costs, externalities, and risks that they generate to the 
participants of this complex web. 
Lastly, the focus of this research is mainly the potential for accountability that a regulatory 
evaluation structure could have, considering the relationships identified within a 
presidential constitutional system. Therefore, it is necessary to use the tools provided by 
the administrative law literature, specifically the literature on delegation and 
accountability. For a more complete analysis of this topic, the concept of accountability is 
considered; its components; the interaction that might make a person accountable in the 
state-individuals relationship that this branch of law focuses on, as well as other concepts.  
Considering the foregoing, the novelty of this work is neither the analysis of the existing 
policy assessment methodologies nor of the governance structures by themselves, but 
rather their interaction. It provides a holistic perspective which integrates public law, 
administrative law, particularly accountability, into policy assessment and law and 
economics. Academically, these areas of the law are often treated as separated, but here the 
aim is to integrate them. 
In addition to bringing together these streams of literature, the main contribution of this 
Thesis is providing a framework with which it is possible to measure the contribution of 
the Policy Evaluation Cycle to accountability, considering the specificities of the 
relationships that are present in a typical presidential constitutional system of a Latin 
American country.  
Furthermore, the contribution of this Thesis might be relevant not only to Latin American 
countries but also to other countries with presidential constitutional systems that are 
adopting or have implemented a regulatory evaluation structure. This is intended to fill an 
important gap in the literature, but it could also open the door for further research and be 
useful in practice. 
F. Societal Relevance  
Societies evolve in their preferences, and such changes are often reflected in the demands 
that the population has towards their politicians and governments. Likewise, these changes 
should reflect on the responses of their governments to satisfy those demands. Responding 
to a societal demand of perhaps regulations that are more efficient or less burdensome, of 
more transparency and accountability in regulatory-making process, or just responding to 
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external pressure, Latin American countries are increasingly adopting and implementing 
regulatory evaluation arrangements as part of their decision-making processes. 
There has been a growing tendency of citizens demanding higher transparency, sanctions, 
and accountability from their politicians and decision-makers. The results of these 
demands have ranged from removing seating presidents from office through impeachment; 
to incarcerating public officials; to demanding accountability and transparency from their 
bureaucrats and politicians. When politicians depart from these preferences, and the 
citizens are aware of this departure, they might react with their votes. This might explain 
why governments and politicians are willingly adopting tools that are bound to decrease 
their discretion in decision-making, and that would make them accountable to the 
population. Regardless of that motivation, Latin American countries are implementing 
these arrangements and moreover, some are doing so with the explicit goal of increasing 
accountability in their regulatory production. 
This relatively new phenomenon is bound to change the decision-making process of Latin 
American countries to some degree, and, perhaps the relationships between the 
government and its stakeholders. In the current stage that the region is at, this study gains 
timely relevance. Particularly, the identification of the different forms that the regulatory 
policy structure can adopt to respond to various regulatory goals; and more importantly if 
and how the use of the Policy Evaluation Cycle can contribute towards increasing the 
accountability of the actors within regulatory-making process. 
G. Scope and Methodology 
The topic of this Thesis can be explored from multiple angles, and thus, several questions 
arise. This makes it necessary to limit the scope for the research. On the one hand, this 
Thesis focuses on policy assessment policy structures and the better regulation agenda at 
the strategic and administrative level. It does not explore the policy assessment of a 
particular market, economic or legal area, but instead it pays attention to the 
organizational components of these arrangements. Nevertheless, the eventual findings and 
conclusions of this Thesis could be later applied to specific sectors.  
On the other hand, the countries examined in this Thesis are all Latin American countries; 
therefore, the research is geographically limited. Specifically, it collects and analyzes data 
from Mexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, Brazil, Costa Rica, Argentina 
and the Dominican Republic, which are the countries of the region that have adopted some 
type of instruments for policy assessment as part of their regulatory policy, up to June \st, 
_^\]. The common features of these countries, such as their presidential constitutional 
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system, type of government and collaborative work regarding their regulatory policies, 
allow for a joint analysis of their better regulation agendas. It is granted that the eventual 
findings may also apply to other countries with similar characteristics or constitutional 
systems; however, they are not considered for this research. The same might also hold for 
other constitutional systems such as parliamentarism, which could be the subject of further 
research.  
Just like with the scope of the research, this topic can be researched using a variety of 
methodologies. In that sense, first, Chapter \, relies on theoretical analysis, by utilizing 
combined strands of literature such as public law, accountability and policy analysis. 
Chapter _ gathers information about the different policy assessment instruments and 
regulatory policies that European countries and the United states have used, by analyzing 
their existing regulations, policy documents and publications on the topic. It uses law and 
economics and policy analysis literature, to examine how the different elements are 
structured, to determine the goals they are set to achieve as well as the incentives they 
create, and to organize these elements into a framework centered in the goals that they 
seek.    
Chapter c studies the policy assessment structures that Latin American countries have 
adopted. It first collects the data from the legal instruments that contain provisions 
regarding their regulatory policy, through the reading and analysis of the constitutions, 
laws, decrees and other legal documents enacted in the researched countries. In addition 
to desk-research, it contrasts the structures adopted by these Latin American countries 
with the framework developed in Chapter _. This allows for the analysis of the structures 
and identification of patterns in the better regulation agenda of the region.  
In turn, for Chapter `, the methodology is theoretical analysis, relying on the existing 
literature on accountability to analyze the governance arrangements of Latin American 
countries and eventually apply it to the analysis of the Policy Evaluation Cycle. Lastly, 
Chapter a synthetizes the insights from the accountability literature and the policy 
assessment literature to develop a framework for assessing the accountability of the policy 
evaluation cycle, within particular regulatory relationships.  Scorecards were designed to 
assign a score to the stages of the policy evaluation cycle based on their contribution 
towards accountability in a specific regulatory relationship. These scorecards are based on 
the characteristics of the PEC and the relationships, as defined by the theory, empirical 
studies, and practice in their best-practice scenario that are analyzed and researched in this 
Thesis. 
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Referring to both the scope and the methodology, it is relevant to point out that the 
findings of this Thesis are not tested empirically in a country or an agency, and this could 
be done in further research. 
K. Structure of the Thesis 
In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, there is now an explanation of how this 
Thesis is divided and structured, as well as the content of each Chapter, in the course of 
answering the research questions. 
In Chapter \, the intention is to provide an initial general theoretical framework. So it 
discusses the approaches from the literature towards policy assessment, beginning by 
understanding its basic concepts. Likewise, it examines the rationales for the adoption of 
the better regulation agenda and policy assessment structures. As the Thesis progresses, it 
uses that theoretical framework to analyze from a Law and Economics approach the 
implementation of policy evaluation by Latin American countries, as well as the goals that 
these countries aim to meet as a result. This Chapter answers the following research 
question: What are the rationales behind the adoption of policy evaluation systems within 
the regulatory-making process of countries? 
After providing an understanding of the different rationales that a country may have to 
adopt policy evaluation into their policy-making process, Chapter _ discusses the practical 
terms of policy assessment, and what the implementation and use of the better regulation 
agenda entails. It examines the different elements to be considered when adopting and 
implementing a policy evaluation arrangement, as well as the intended goals of the 
different choices within the legal system. This Chapter considers specifically the scope of 
the policy assessment; the use of the PEC to assess regulations at several points of their 
lives; the different evaluation tools that are commonly used; and the governance and 
oversight of the regulatory evaluation process. In this sense, in this Chapter the aim is to 
identify whether the different choices to build the assessment structure could lead to the 
attainment of specific regulatory goals. For that, it analyzes the potential incentives that 
the choices concerning each element might generate. These findings are helpful in two 
ways: First, they facilitate understanding of the trends and provide a clearer road map for 
the adoption by a country of policy assessment structures and governance; and second, 
they serve as a guide to compare with existing arrangements to determine whether there is 
coherence between the structure and the goals. The research questions that Chapter _ aims 
to answer are (i) Which are the composing elements of a regulatory evaluation structure? 
(ii) Which are the options that a country or administration can choose from to compose its 
regulatory evaluation structure? and (iii) Which type of regulatory evaluation arrangement 
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has the potential to create the conditions and incentives for the actors in a legal system in 
order to achieve specific regulatory goals? 
Because the research focus of this Thesis is on Latin American countries, two important 
research questions rise: (i) Which are the policy assessment goals and structures set by 
Latin American countries for their better regulation agenda?; (ii) Do the elements chosen 
by Latin American countries for each component of the structure correspond to the goals 
previously set by selected countries? In this sense, Chapter c evaluates the better regulation 
agenda in Latin America to understand which goals these countries are pursuing with the 
adoption of this agenda; the scope and time of the assessments, the evaluation tools being 
used, as well as their governance. Bringing together the findings from Chapter _, it 
contrasts the better regulation agenda of selected countries with the policy assessment 
structures discussed, to analyze whether the structure chosen is oriented towards achieving 
their chosen goals, whether it has the potential to generate the incentives and create the 
effects expected from it to achieve the regulatory goal chosen, and/or whether there are 
discrepancies. 
The policy assessment structure required for goals such as an accountability and efficiency, 
particularly considering the use of the PEC and its different stages, can be analyzed further 
by first studying what the goals entail in practical terms, how it operates within a 
presidential constitutional system, and eventually how the assessment itself is designed, 
or, not towards the chosen goal. In Latin America there is a social requirement of more 
transparency and accountability in the regulatory-making process, and thus it seems to be 
set also as a goal for having a better regulation agenda. Considering the foregoing for the 
rest of this thesis, there is a focus on the use of policy assessment systems as an 
accountability tool. 
The literature holds that policy assessment can enhance the accountability of the 
policymakers towards their forum. Here it is argued, however, that this potential to 
enhance accountability is not necessarily a default. How these policy evaluation systems 
are designed is relevant to whether they can address the accountability issues that exist 
within the different relationships of the policy-making realm. But to be able to know that, 
it is first necessary to understand what exactly accountability is, and more specifically, what 
accountability looks like in the relationships that exist in the decision-making 
arrangements of a Latin American country, since they have a presidential constitutional 
system. Therefore, in Chapter ` the aim is to answer the following research questions: (i) 
which accountability relationships exist in the regulatory-making arrangements of Latin 
American countries? And (ii) which accountability problems can be identified in the 
regulatory relationships of a country with a presidential system?  
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Finally, Chapter a joins two relevant streams of literature, accountability and policy 
evaluation, to determine if, as claimed by the literature, policy evaluation instruments are 
set to increase accountability in the regulatory-making process of a country. While the PEC, 
as a combination of policy evaluation stages, might contribute to accountability, the claim 
is that its contribution, compared to a scenario where such stages are not in place, might 
be different in the various stages of the cycle, and for different regulatory relationships. 
Therefore, there is an analysis of how accountability plays out throughout the various 
stages of the PEC, and how it plays out differently throughout these stages within the 
diverse types of regulatory relationships that exist in the presidential constitutional system 
that Latin American countries have. In this Chapter the aim is to answer the following 
research questions: (i) considering the type of relationships that exist in this regulatory-
making system, is it possible to address those problems with a better regulation agenda? 
And finally, (ii) can the Policy Evaluation Cycle contribute towards accountability, and if 
so, in which conditions? 
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This research started with two complementing research questions: Why are Latin American 
countries adopting a better regulation agenda? Can this contribute towards accountability, 
and if so, in which conditions? 
The answer to the first question initially identified three rationales that might explain why 
Latin American countries are adopting and implementing regulatory policies: to enact 
more efficient or effective regulations; to increase accountability in the regulatory-making 
process; and as a result of policy transplant or third-party influence. These rationales were 
explained by the literature on public law and economics, administrative law, and transplant 
theory, respectively.  
The answer to the second research question required, however, a more complex and 
lengthy analysis. Based on the existing literature and international practice, I studied in 
detail the components of a regulatory policy and their governance. This included the scope 
of the assessment; when are the assessments performed; the tools used for the assessments; 
and the governance of the assessments. I organized these components into several matrices 
based on the rationales previously identified. It served to understand how these conditions 
could be created in a way that the intended goals that countries had for implementing a 
better regulation agenda could be achieved.  
With this part of the research, I saw that the interaction between regulatory evaluation 
tools and their governance is generally under-studied and that Latin American countries 
are not the exception. Since these countries have been adopting and implementing 
different forms of a regulatory evaluation policy over the last decade, they were the focus 
of this research. In this Thesis, I presented an updated detailed description of the policy 
assessment arrangements of the Latin American countries that have either adopted or 
implemented them. In turn, I studied the different arrangements that these countries have 
chosen for their policy assessment structures, as well as their governance, and identified 
common trends.  
Most of the Latin American countries studied expressly stated regulatory accountability as 
one of the goals for adopting their better regulation agenda. In other words, the adoption 
of a regulatory evaluation policy was also aimed at increasing accountability in their 
regulatory-making process, in addition to efficiency and reduction of regulatory burden. 
Therefore, I focused on accountability to answer the second research question.  
Even though accountability is not a natural Law and Economics term, it is used in the 
regulatory field. According to the leading literature, a regulator is accountable to its forum 
when it informs them of his actions; there is a space for discussion of the actions; and lastly, 
CONCLUSION 
 0:6 
when there are consequences, either positive or negative, to the actions of the regulator. 
These are known as the accountability dimensions: information, discussion and 
consequences.  
To be able to apply the lessons from the accountability literature to the particularities of 
regulatory evaluation, I first examined how the decision-making process is structured in 
presidential systems. This is because the researched Latin American countries have this 
constitutional system, and thus their accountability relationships are framed within the 
particularities of this system. In Latin American countries, most of the regulatory decisions 
are made by a body of the executive power, and the public administration is mostly directed 
and accountable to the president. This means that there is a principal-agent relationship 
between these public administrations and the president. However, there are other bodies 
of the public administration that are independent and are not directly accountable to the 
president, which are independent regulatory agencies. These agencies are thus accountable 
in other ways, and to other forums, such as their stakeholders, oversight bodies or courts.  
This showed that accountability is expressed differently depending on the relationship and 
interactions between the actors and their forum. Consequently, this means that the 
contribution on accountability that a regulatory policy might have would be closely linked 
to the relationship being considered.  
Going back to the topic of regulatory evaluation, the different stages of assessing 
regulations are public consultation, ex ante assessment, drafting and implementation, 
monitoring and ex post assessment. I referred to those stages as the Policy Evaluation Cycle. 
Each one of the stages have a different function. They generate different incentives for the 
regulator, depending on the relationship on which the stages are executed.  
The main contribution of this Thesis is thus bringing together these strands of literature 
and building a framework that assesses the contribution towards accountability of each 
stage of the Policy Evaluation Cycle on different regulatory relationships. The framework 
scores each stage by evaluating them on each dimension of accountability. It shows to 
which degree the stages and the cycle as a whole contribute towards accountability in a 
specific relationship of a presidential constitutional system. The results showed that even 
when a policy assessment structure might contribute towards accountability, this 
contribution is not absolute as it only operates in specific relationships, and even more, in 
particular stages of the Policy Evaluation Cycle and at different degrees.  
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Main findings and contributions to the literature 
The first research question was “why are Latin American countries adopting a better 
regulation agenda?”. This question arose from a simple and verified observation: In the last 
two decades Latin American countries have been increasingly and steadily adopting a 
better regulation agenda. This agenda is composed of instruments for assessing their 
existing and potential regulations, and of governance structures for the use of these 
instruments and for oversight of the assessments. By _^\], ten Latin American countries, 
namely, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Chile, Dominican Republic, Peru, 
Argentina and Brazil had adopted a better regulation agenda at different degrees and at 
different points in time. Enough to make it a trend.  
With the lessons from the literature in public law & economics, policy assessment, public 
law, accountability and transplant theory, I identified three rationales that might explain 
this trend. In that sense, the first identified rationale for adopting this agenda is the main 
normative use of policy assessment tools: to improve the quality of regulations. This entails 
the evaluation of the effects of existing or future regulations that serve to inform the 
decision-maker of the most efficient or effective (depending on the country’s or regulator’s 
goals) options to address the economic, regulatory or social problem at hand.  
The second rationale I identified is enhancing regulatory accountability. The enactment of 
primary legislation or secondary regulations comes always from a delegation done by either 
the people or from one power of the state to another or to a body within the same power. 
As held by the Agency Theory, the principal, who delegates, needs to foster a system where 
he can monitor the actions of his agents or create the right incentives to align the acts of 
the agent with the interests of the principal (Ross, \]gc). Thus, the governance of a policy 
assessment structure, that provides for transparency, oversight and reports, as well as the 
systematic evaluation of the regulations enacted could contribute towards enhancing 
accountability. This would overcome one of the main downfalls of delegation, which is that 
the delegating party does not have sufficient expertise or time, or it could be costly to have, 
to oversee the actions of the delegated party. Certainly, in that case, it would require that 
the reports and information provided are understandable to the delegator. At the same 
time, having a regulatory evaluation structure might provide positive and negative 
incentives to the agents to align their actions with the preferences of their principals.   
The third rationale is third-party influence, which can be partly explained by the 
transplantation theory. In that sense, Latin American countries might be influenced by the 
practices of other countries in the region, as well as by the recommendations of 
international or regional organizations. From the research it was evident the cooperation 
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between Latin American countries, led by Mexico; as well as the active promotion of the 
agenda by the OECD in the region. Countries often respond to the need of signaling that 
they conform to standards and international practices. This could be to attract investors or 
signal reliability. At other times this action can be motivated by the countries’ self-interest 
when the adoption of a policy is a requirement to be a member of an organization or group. 
Likewise, the motivation might be to give the appearance that the government or 
politicians have a system that responds to accountability or to efficiency and give the 
impression that they comply with the internal requirements of the population or demands 
of the international community. Of course, most likely these rationales did not operate in 
isolation and a combination of them might accurately explain the trend in the region. One 
of the contributions of this Thesis is the identification and initial analysis of these 
rationales, using different strands of literature. In that sense, each one of these rationales 
can be the subject of individual research to determine whether the adoption and 
implementation of a better regulation agenda or a regulatory policy is justified by the 
chosen rationale. 
In the topic of policy assessment, international practice has pushed the literature to study 
the phenomena and to analyze from different points the use of certain instruments, or the 
organizational and governance structures into which these instruments have been adopted. 
Even in this topic, there is the old question of the chicken and the egg. The practice may 
have come first; however, it is deeply guided by the literature, the educated analysis of 
previous experiences, and the adaptation of the practices that have not worked and those 
that have. In that sense, after understanding the rationales for the adoption of a better 
regulation agenda, it was essential for my research to understand what that adoption and 
implementation looked like in practice. Thus the relevant components to be considered for 
a regulatory evaluation policy that I identified from the literature on policy assessment and 
international practice were (i) scope of the assessment; (ii) the moment(s) for the 
assessments; (iii) the tools used for the assessments; and (iv) the governance of the 
assessments.  
For each one of those components, there were different options to choose from. This was a 
stepping-stone to arrange each of the options based on the goal that they potentially serve. 
I based these arrangements on the common practices from international experience, the 
findings and interpretation of the specialized literature in the field of policy assessment, 
public law, administrative law and agency theory. The result of this merge was the second 
contribution of this research: A workable framework or matrix that contains several 
proposed arrangements of the options of each element that compose a regulatory 
evaluation policy arrangement. Each arrangement is based on the rationales previously 
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identified, in a way of understanding how these conditions could be created for those goals 
to be achieved.  
It showed, for instance, that when accountability is one of the goals of adopting a regulatory 
evaluation policy, the structure of the regulatory policy is expected to include in its scope 
secondary regulations enacted by regulatory agencies. Likewise, regulations are expected 
to be assessed through all stages of the Policy Evaluation Cycle, using regulatory evaluation 
tools such as SCM and CBA. Regarding oversight, it is expected that the process of 
evaluating regulations as well as of enacting regulations is properly assessed by an oversight 
body, to address the issues drawn out by the Agency Theory.  
Up to this moment, neither the literature nor international practice had organized the 
different elements of the governance of policy assessment to focus or follow a specific goal. 
In that sense, the proposed framework provides structure to the different findings of the 
literature on policy assessment, by arranging the complexity into manageable categories. 
It also serves as a framework to contrast with the existing regulatory evaluation governance 
of a country or a sector. This could serve, for instance, to assesses whether the regulatory 
governance arrangement implemented in a country is serving the goal that it is intended 
for. 
The framework, however, does not intend to be a fixed statement on how the elements 
should be arranged nor does it propose that one arrangement only fits one goal. It is, 
however, an attempt at identifying and organizing common practices into replicable 
structures, based on their inherent characteristics and the goals they pursue. Certainly, this 
proposal presents its own limitations, that can also be seen as opportunities. For one, it has 
not been tested empirically, and without a doubt it is something interesting for further 
research. 
So far, this Thesis has shown on the one hand the different rationales that countries, and 
particularly Latin American countries, may have to adopt regulatory evaluation agendas; 
and on the other hand, what the international practice and various literature strands have 
shared regarding the governance and use of regulatory policies. This allowed me to build 
the aforementioned framework and to provide the base to look at the main subject of the 
research: Latin American countries.  
I presented the content of the legal instruments on policy assessment of Latin American 
countries organized and analyzed based on the common components expected from a 
regulatory evaluation structure, with its strengths, weaknesses and potentials. Because this 
is a relatively new phenomenon to the Latin American region, this particular contribution, 
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though partly descriptive, was first useful for the analysis performed, and can also serve as 
the base for further research. 
I used my framework to contrast it to the regulatory evaluation structures of Mexico, Chile 
and the Dominican Republic. This exercise revealed that Mexico’s governance structure 
matches what is expected for a country with efficiency as a goal, and partially matches what 
is expected for a country with accountability as a goal. This could be explained by the fact 
that Mexico was the first country to implement a regulatory policy, which has been in 
constant change and improvement. This could have led to the gradual adaption of the 
system to the needs of the country. On the contrary, it showed that both Chile and the 
Dominican Republic have structures that do not match some of their revealed goals, mainly 
when it comes to accountability (in the case of the Dominican Republic) and administrative 
simplification (in the case of Chile).  
Some of the countries examined have accountability as a goal for their policy assessment 
agendas. One thing that still holds from the initial findings of this Thesis, is that the 
introduction and implementation of policy evaluation systems in Latin America can be 
used as a bargaining chip for politicians, as they can respond to the demand for 
accountability of their population in exchange for fulfilling their own preferences, to 
remain in power. Considering that, and also considering that all of the Latin American 
countries studied have a presidential Constitutional system, for the rest of the research I 
focused on studying accountability as a rationale and a goal for assessing regulations. Thus, 
getting closer to answering the second part of the research question which was “can the 
implementation of policy assessment systems contribute towards accountability, and if so, 
under which conditions?” 
Since an accountability relationship requires there to be information, discussion and 
consequences to the actions of the actor, it was relevant to determine how these 
relationships operated in the Latin American system. One of the findings of this Thesis was 
that in the Latin American presidential systems there are many and different regulatory 
relationships. The actors do not interact with their forums in only one manner. Therefore, 
there are various accountability relationships. These relationships are complex, and so are 
their interactions.  
Thus, another contribution of this Thesis is bringing together the literature on 
accountability with the literature on policy assessment. More specifically, when doing so, 
analyzing policy assessment as a whole, as a structure, and not only particular aspects of it. 
This exercise aimed at identifying the common grounds between these two areas of study.  
This is because the literature on policy assessment held that this tool was useful for 
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accountability purposes. However, the complexity identified on the regulatory 
accountability relationships of the presidential system needs to be considered when 
analyzing how the different aspects of a policy assessment policy play into accountability.   
It was initially evident that even when it was possible that regulatory evaluation structures 
could contribute towards accountability, it was unlikely that all stages of the evaluation 
would contribute equally. Therefore, there were certain conditions to be met. Also, 
depending on the regulatory relationship where the policy assessment was being 
performed, different conditions need to exist for the regulator to be accountable to his 
forum. Consequently, I aimed to answer the last part of the last research question, which 
asked under which conditions can the implementation of policy assessment structures 
contribute towards accountability. 
I thus created the main contribution of this Thesis: A framework to assess the contribution 
towards accountability that each stage of the policy evaluation cycle has, considering the 
particularities of the different regulatory relationships that can be found in a presidential 
system. I applied the framework to the current practices of policy assessment to determine 
whether and how public consultation, ex ante assessment, drafting and implementation, 
monitoring and ex post assessment, as stages of the policy evaluation cycle, contributed 
towards the different dimensions of accountability. I adjusted the framework even further 
to assess the contribution of these stages on different regulatory relationships of a 
presidential system.  
For instance, I assessed the contribution of the PEC to the relationship between 
independent regulatory agencies and its stakeholders. It showed that in this relationship 
one of the stages that contributes the most towards each dimension of accountability is 
public consultation. In this relationship, the regulator cannot be directly punished (e.g. 
removed) by its stakeholders; however, it relies on its reputation and collaboration of its 
stakeholders for a good performance. Therefore, its high score in this stage can be explained 
by the fact that this is the moment where stakeholders can interact directly with the 
regulator, undertake direct conversations and eventually agree or disagree with a proposed 
regulation.  
Just as with that example, the scoring showed that indeed different stages of the Policy 
Evaluation Cycle contribute to different degrees of accountability, and some do not 
contribute at all. Furthermore, it confirmed that this contribution towards accountability 
is different, based on the regulatory relationship that is been considered.  
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In addition to this, other findings came from this assessment. The dimensions of 
accountability can potentially interact among themselves creating spillovers, both positive 
and negative. Likewise, the stages of the PEC can complement each other and have the 
potential of mutually reinforcing their contribution towards accountability.  
These findings answer the final research question and add to the existing literature when 
they show that indeed policy assessment structures have the potential to contribute to a 
greater or lesser extent to the accountability of the regulatory-making process and its 
actors. However, the contribution of each stage will depend on the stage of the evaluation 
and on the relationship that exists between the actors that participate in the regulatory 
process.   
Finally, another contribution of this Thesis to the literature is bringing together strands of 
literature that were previously studied separately. It shows that different types of literature 
can influence each other in a fruitful way. Even though accountability is not a law and 
economics concept, this Thesis showed that, on the one hand, its principles and composing 
parts can be combined with the literature on policy assessment, particularly in the 
environment of a presidential constitutional system, which can be extended to other 
systems. On the other hand, they can be used to evaluate the different stages for assessing 
regulations in a regulatory evaluation framework, considering the incentives that the actors 
have when interacting with their forum in that realm.  
Policy implications, practical uses and further research 
From the main findings of this Thesis there are some policy implications that can be drawn, 
as well as practical uses. In that sense, the first framework developed in this Thesis can be 
used for countries to assess whether their current regulatory evaluation structure is aligned 
with the goals that they are pursuing. It can also serve as a guide for which tools, scope or 
governance a country is expected to have depending on the goal that it is pursuing. 
More importantly, the framework developed in this Thesis for assessing the contribution 
towards accountability of a particular policy assessment set-up could be tested in practice. 
Latin American countries can assess whether their structure is oriented towards 
accountability and if so, how well they are doing. In other words, governments or 
regulatory agencies could use it to assess the contribution of accountability of their current 
regulatory structure. Depending on which regulatory relationship within their political set- 
up is important to have higher accountability, and depending on the score that the 
framework shows, the country could choose where and how to improve its regulatory 
evaluation structure. 
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Additionally, the framework can be used by international organizations that study and 
advise countries on their regulatory policies such as the World Bank and the OECD, to 
assess accountability across jurisdictions that have implemented one or more stages of the 
policy evaluation cycle. This assessment could be even used to promote the adoption of 
these assessment tools considering their functions as accountability instruments. 
Since this is a first attempt at creating this framework, it can be of course refined and 
improved. This could be done, for instance, by adjusting the scoring methodology to better 
reflect the importance (or lack thereof) of a statement or of a practice. 
It is relevant to point out that the framework is designed to evaluate regulatory 
relationships within a presidential system in Latin American. Evidently, it can also be used 
by other countries that have the same government system, perhaps adjusting the 
statements and possibly the scoring. Nevertheless, even though it is designed for a 
presidential system, this framework can be modified and extended to other forms of 
government, such as a parliamentarian system or to international organizations. This will 
of course require further research. First, it will be necessary to identify the regulatory 
relationships that exist in the chosen system, how the actors and forums interact with each 
other, to determine their accountability dynamics; and second, to adjust the framework to 
reflect this.  
This is a contribution towards the fields and literature on policy assessment, accountability 
and public administrative law and economics. The avenue is open for improvements and 
new research in the field. It is open to improve the use of the framework to assess the 
contribution on accountability of regulatory policies.
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Better Regulation in Latin American countries: A tool for accountability? 
 
In the last few years, a steadily increasing number of Latin American countries have been 
adopting policy assessment instruments and new governance structures for them, as part 
of their policymaking process. Even though the literature argues that these instruments 
serve, among other things, as tools for accountability, for this to be so, it is necessary to 
take into account the legal system, decision-making process, and regulatory relationships 
that exist in the adopting countries. This Thesis researches the policy assessment 
arrangements adopted and implemented in the Latin American region to understand why 
are these countries adopting and implementing tools for policy evaluation? Can this 
contribute towards regulatory accountability, and if so, in which conditions? 
The Thesis first analyzes the rationales that these countries might have to adopt these 
regulatory policy arrangements. It then studies the various tools used for policy assessment, 
paying attention to the scope of the assessments, the times and the stages on which 
regulations are assessed, referred to as the Policy Evaluation Cycle (PEC), as well as to the 
governance of these processes. The Thesis develops a framework where each of these 
components are organized and classified based on which goals or rationales they serve. 
This can assist countries on deciding how to implement their policy evaluation 
arrangements, to serve their own goals.  
Since all of the studied countries have presidential systems, this Thesis studies how 
regulations are made in this system, and the multiple needed delegations for policymaking, 
which results in various regulatory relationships. Thus, the desired accountability of 
policymakers towards their different forums makes relevant the adoption this agenda for 
regulatory accountability reasons. 
Bringing to together the literatures on public law, accountability and policy evaluation, this 
Thesis builds a framework for assessing the contribution towards accountability that each 
stage of the PEC might have in a specific regulatory relationship. The framework shows to 
which degree the stages, and the cycle as a whole, contribute towards accountability in 
specific relationships of a presidential constitutional system. The results evidence that even 
when a policy assessment structure might contribute towards accountability, this 
contribution is not absolute as it only operates in specific regulatory relationships, and even 
more, only in some stages of the PEC contributing at different degrees. This framework can 
be used by governments or regulatory agencies as an instrument to assess the contribution 
to accountability of their existing or potential regulatory policy structures in order to 
improve it.   
    
  
  
    
  
Betere regelgeving in Latijns-Amerikaanse landen: een instrument voor accountability? 
In de afgelopen jaren heeft een gestaag groeiend aantal Latijns-Amerikaanse landen 
regelgevingsbeoordelingsinstrumenten en daarmee overeenkomende beleidsinstrumenten 
aangenomen als onderdeel van hun regelgevingsbeleidsagenda. Dit wordt een betere 
regelgevingsagenda genoemd. In de literatuur wordt gesteld dat deze instrumenten, onder 
andere, dienen als instrumenten voor accountability. Ik stel echter dat ook al zou dit waar 
zijn, het noodzakelijk is om in de desbetreffende landen eerst het aanwezige rechtssysteem, 
besluitvormingsproces en de regelgevingsrelaties in aanmerking te nemen.  
In deze Thesis onderzoek ik de regelgevingsbeoordelingsinstrumenten die onlangs zijn 
aangenomen en ingevoerd in de Latijns-Amerikaanse regio en hun potentieel voor 
accountability. In die zin wil ik de volgende onderzoeksvragen beantwoorden: Waarom 
worden in Latijns-Amerikaanse landen betere regelgevingsagenda’s aangenomen en 
ingevoerd? Kan dit bijdragen aan accountability en zo ja, onder welke voorwaarden? 
Eerst analyseer ik de redenen waarom deze landen misschien een betere 
regelgevingsagenda zouden moeten aannemen, inclusief het argument van meer 
accountability in het regelgevingsproces. Vervolgens bestudeer ik hun diverse onderdelen 
en bepaal welke doelen of redenen deze onderdelen dienen. Daarbij besteed ik aandacht 
aan de reikwijdte van de beoordelingen, de fasen waarin regelgeving wordt beoordeeld, 
door mij genoemd de Beleidsevaluatiecyclus [Policy Evaluation Cycle (PEC)], en aan het 
beheer van deze processen.  
Aan de interactie tussen regelgevingsevaluatie-instrumenten en hun beheer wordt 
doorgaans weinig aandacht besteed, vooral in Latijns-Amerika. Ik bestudeer de 
verschillende regelingen betreffende regelgevingsbeoordelingsbeleid die deze landen 
hebben aangenomen en het beheer daarvan. Daarnaast bestudeer ik, omdat al deze landen 
een presidentieel systeem hebben, hoe besluiten worden genomen in dit systeem en hoe 
dit leidt tot een belangrijk niveau van delegatie voor regelgevingsproductie. Aldus wordt 
de reden voor het aannemen van deze agenda voor regelgevingsaccountability relevant. 
Een regelgevende instantie is accountable jegens haar forum wanneer zij dit informeert 
over haar acties, er ruimte is voor bespreking van de acties en ten slotte, wanneer er 
gevolgen zijn, hetzij positief of negatief, van de acties van de regelgevende instantie. 
Daarom combineer ik als antwoord op de overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag van deze 
Thesis twee relevante stromingen in de literatuur, accountability en beleidsevaluatie. 
Hoewel de PEC een bijdrage zou kunnen leveren aan accountability stel ik dat deze bijdrage 
kan verschillen in de diverse fasen van de cyclus en zelfs kan variëren voor verschillende 
regelgevingsrelaties.  
    
  
In deze Thesis bouw ik een kader voor beoordeling van de bijdrage aan accountability die 
elke fase van de PEC kan hebben in een specifieke regelgevingsrelatie en in het algemeen 
onder welke voorwaarden beleidsbeoordelingsstructuren meer bijdragen aan 
accountability. Het kader laat zien in welke mate de fasen en de cyclus als geheel bijdragen 
aan accountability in een specifieke relatie van een presidentieel constitutioneel systeem. 
De resultaten laten zien dat ook al zou een regelgevingsbeoordelingsstructuur bijdragen 
aan accountability, deze bijdrage niet absoluut is omdat deze alleen werkt in specifieke 
relaties en bovendien in bepaalde fasen van de PEC en in verschillende mate.  
  
    
  
La Mejora Regulatoria en Latinoamérica: ¿Un instrumento para la rendición de cuentas 
regulatoria (accountability)? 
Durante estos últimos años, cada vez más países de Latinoamérica han adoptado 
instrumentos para la evaluación de sus regulaciones como parte de su política regulatoria, 
así como las estructuras de gobierno necesarias para su manejo. Esto se conoce como una 
agenda de mejora regulatoria. La literatura argumenta que estos instrumentos de 
evaluación sirven, entre otras, como herramientas para la rendición de cuentas y 
responsabilidad regulatoria (accountability). Aún cuando esta afirmación puede tener 
mérito, para suscribirla es necesario considerar las condiciones del país que adopta este 
tipo de agenda, en particular su sistema legal, su proceso de toma de decisiones y las 
relaciones entre los actores que interactúan en la creación y evaluación de regulaciones. 
En esta Tesis estudio los arreglos para evaluación de regulaciones que han sido adoptados 
e implementados por los países Latinoamericanos, la motivación para su adopción e 
implementación, y si estos tienen potencial para mejorar la rendición de cuentas durante 
los procesos de creación y modificación de regulaciones. Por tanto, el objetivo principal es 
responder estas preguntas: ¿Por qué los países latinoamericanos están adoptando e 
implementado agendas de mejora regulatoria? ¿Puede esto contribuir a la rendición de 
cuentas regulatoria, y en caso de que sí, bajo cuáles condiciones? 
En esta Tesis primero analizo las razones que los países podrían tener para adoptar una 
agenda de mejora regulatoria, incluyendo tener regulaciones más eficientes, querer mejorar 
la rendición de cuentas regulatoria, entre otras. Luego estudio los varios elementos que 
componen una política regulatoria orientada a la evaluación de las regulaciones, e 
identifico a cuáles metas o bases lógicas sirven estos elementos. Para esto, presto particular 
atención al alcance definido para estas evaluaciones, los instrumentos utilizados para 
realizar dichas evaluaciones, el momento en el que las regulaciones son evaluadas, lo cual 
llamo el Ciclo de Evaluación Regulatoria (PEC, por sus siglas en inglés), así como el 
gobierno de todos esto procesos y relaciones que intervienen en los mismos. Como forma 
de sistematización de este análisis, presento un marco que muestra una serie de 
combinaciones de estos elementos, y cómo combinaciones particulares pueden servir para 
alcanzar objetivos regulatorios como eficiencia, rendición de cuentas, reducción de cargas 
administrativa, entre otros. 
La interacción entre los instrumentos de evaluación regulatoria y el gobierno de estos 
instrumentos y procesos no ha sido estudiada a profundidad, particularmente cuando se 
refiere a América Latina. Por tanto, en esta Tesis estudio las políticas de evaluación 
regulatorias que estos países han adoptado, así como sus estructuras para el gobierno de 
    
  
las mismas y sus interacciones. En razón de que todos estos países tienen sistemas 
constitucionales presidencialistas, estudio además el proceso de toma de decisiones en este 
sistema, considerando que, para el proceso de creación de normas y regulaciones, este 
sistema requiere un grado importante de delegaciones (por ejemplo, del constituyente al 
presidente como cabeza del poder ejecutivo, del presidente a las agencias regulatorias, 
entre otras). Por tanto, la adopción de una agenda de mejora regulatoria con el propósito 
de tener rendición de cuentas regulatoria y generar responsabilidad de los actores 
involucrados en este proceso toma especial relevancia.  
En este sentido, se considera que un regulador es responsable y rinde cuentas (accountable) 
hacia su público o foro cuando el regulador informa de sus acciones, hay espacio discutir 
estas acciones, y cuando existen consecuencias, bien sean negativas o positivas, a las 
acciones del regulador. Por tanto, para responder a la pregunta marco de esta tesis, analizo 
de manera conjunta dos corrientes de literatura relevantes: la literatura sobre rendición de 
cuentas (accountability) y la literatura sobre evaluación regulatoria. El argumento que 
presento es que a pesar de que el ciclo de la evaluación regulatoria estructurada de las 
regulaciones puede contribuir a la rendición de cuentas regulatoria, esta contribución 
variará durante las diferentes etapas del PEC, y además podría variar dependiendo de la 
relación regulatoria de que se trate, es decir, dónde se esté creando y evaluando la 
regulación y la delegación que fue necesaria para esto. 
En esta Tesis creo un marco para evaluar la contribución de cada etapa del PEC hacia la 
rendición de cuenta regulatoria de los actores que intervienen en el proceso regulatorio. 
Este marco considera las diferentes relaciones de delegación y jerarquía que existen en el 
proceso de creación y evaluación de regulaciones, y de forma general permite evaluar bajo 
cuáles condiciones los arreglos de evaluación regulatoria pueden ser útiles para la rendición 
de cuentas. El marco creado muestra qué tanto cada etapa, y el PEC en su conjunto, 
contribuyen a la rendición de cuentas regulatoria en relaciones que existen dentro de un 
sistema presidencialista. El resultado de la evaluación evidencia que aún cuando una 
estructura particular de evaluación de regulaciones podría contribuir a la rendición de 
cuentas regulatoria, esta contribución no es absoluta ni uniforme. Esta solo sucede en 
relaciones regulatoria específicas, solo en momentos específicos del ciclo de evaluación 
regulatoria, y la posibilidad de que haya una rendición de cuentas efectiva variará 
dependiendo la combinación que se dé de esos dos elementos.
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